Adam is a solicitor at Franks Ogilvie. He joined the firm in September 2023 and completed an LLB/BA in 2024, majoring in History and Public Policy. He was admitted as a barrister and solicitor of the High Court in June 2025.
Prior to working at Franks Ogilvie, Adam was part of the team at the New Zealand Free Speech Union, running much of the back-end work of the organisation. He also interned for a Member of Parliament in 2020.
Adam is passionate about liberal democratic values and the importance of a robust civil society. Outside his work and studies, he enjoys getting out into the various tracks and DOC huts in the Wellington region.
The Arms Act 2026 is an overhaul ofthe Arms Act 1983, making significant changes to the regulation offirearms in New Zealand.
The Act comes into force on 23 September 2026, including the establishment of the new firearms regulator. Some changes will only come into force in 2027 and 2028.
The 2026 Act’s most significant change is separating responsibility for firearms regulation from the Police and handing it to a newly created Arms Regulator (“Regulator”). The Regulator will be responsible for the administration of the 2026 Act, including firearms licensing and registration.
The Regulator will report independently to the Minister responsible for the Act, but will be “hosted” by the Police, using their corporate resources. Police will not be involved in regulatory matters such as licensing but Police will still work closely with the Regulator to enforce firearms safety. The Regulator and Police’s relationship will include a new “red-flag” system whereby the Police, and other government agencies such as the Security Intelligence Service, will be able to alert the Regulator to information that may affect a licence holder’s “fit and proper” status.
The Police’s current internal review process for decisions on firearms licences will be disestablished. A new Firearms Licence Review Committee (“FLRC”) will review decisions to refuse or revoke a licence, including decisions to impose conditions on licences.
The 2026 Act has renamed “dealer’s licences” to “business licences” and simplified endorsements for business employees. If a person holds a business license for two years without any compliance issues, their licence duration will be extended to five years.
Business licences will still only be issued to individuals (not organisations), but employees of endorsed business license holders will no longer need to obtain endorsements on their personal firearms licences. Business licence holders will also no longer require permits to possess prohibited firearms for up to 21 days, where they receive those firearms for the purposes of repairing, deactivating or converting them to non-prohibited firearms. This exception does not come into force until 23 February 2028.
Firearms or firearm parts manufactured for personal use will only be permitted to be on-sold to licensed businesses.
The 2026 Act also creates a museum-specific licence that doesn’t have to be held by the curator of the museum, rather the best placed employee to do so.
Gang members are now explicitly disqualified from holding a firearms licence.
LFOs will have the option of having secure storage facilities at any location approved by the Regulator instead of their home address.
From February 2028, when the Regulator is concerned about an LFO’s mental health, they will be able to suspend their licence for up to 12 months. This would give the LFO a full year to seek medical advice, receive reports, and address the Regulator’s concerns before they risk having their licence revoked. This is an important change as currently a suspension may only be issued for up to 90 days and during that time, a LFO would need to provide evidence the mental health issue did not affect their ability to safely use a firearm.
The 2026 Act provides for regulations to specify infringement offences (such as for administrative errors). The Regulator will be empowered to issue infringement notices and fees, with 90-day suspensions for ongoing low-level non-compliance.
The specific offence in the 1983 Act of possessing a firearm after having a licence revoked has not been carried over into the 2026 Act. Persons with revoked licences will be able to use firearms while under the direct supervision of an LFO.
Most of the offences from the 1983 Act, which have been carried over into the 2026 Act, have had their penalties increased. In addition, the 2026 Act provides for eight new offences related to firearms safety (such as unsafe storage) and the black-market firearms trade (such as the unlawful 3D printing of firearms).
While the 2026 Act includes many policy changes from the 1983 Act, LFOs' obligations regarding the use and possession of firearms has not drastically changed. The same requirements for an LFO to be a fit and proper person to possess a firearms licence remain, and the 2026 Act still provides that the possession and use of firearms is a privilege. Breaches of firearms regulations still carry serious consequences.
The firearms registry has been continued in the 2026 Act, though the Regulator will not be able to require information beyond what is explicitly provided for by the 2026 Act and its regulations. Other previous changes to firearms law such as the ban on military-style semi-automatic firearms and high-capacity magazines also remain. Outside of the 2026 Act’s administrative changes, LFOs’ day-to-day ownership of firearms will not be significantly different.
The 2026 Act does not define “possess”, which leaves considerable uncertainty regarding the occasions where a person, particularly persons without a licence, are in possession of a firearm. This ambiguity is particularly serious given that the 2026 Act continues the 1983 presumption that persons occupying premises or vehicles in which arms items are found are deemed to be in possession of those items. LFOs should take care to ensure that their firearms and ammunition are not left accessible to unlicensed persons in their premises or vehicles.
The criteria for when a person may not be “fit and proper” allows the Regulator to take into account any matter the Regulator considers relevant. This has been carried over from the 1983 Act. It leaves the specific criteria for when a person is “fit and proper” uncertain and has previously allowed for persons to be denied firearms licences on grounds unrelated to firearm safety.
The 2026 Act also leaves many areas of the upcoming firearms law to regulations that have not been made yet. Matters such as the definitions of many arms items, safe storage requirements, and information for the registry will be provided for in these regulations.
The 2026 Act specifies that fees will be reviewed every five years. This will require consultation with those affected.
For further information on these changes or similar issues, please contact Managing Director Brigitte Morten.
The High Court reinstated Mariameno Kapa-Kingi as a member of Te Pāti Māori (“TPM”), finding she had been unlawfully expelled from TPM. The Court found that the meetings used to suspend, then expel, Kapa-Kingi from TPM were not properly held under TPM’s Constitution (“Constitution”) and breached TPM’s tikanga.
The judgment was later recalled and reissued, after a request of the Speaker of the House.
The Constitution provided that TPM’s National Council (“Council”) could cancel a person’s membership if they did not meet the criteria for Party membership, such as loyalty to the Party, and that a person found to have misused Party funds would be immediately expelled from the Party. The Constitution also provided for a lengthy procedure that the Party would have to follow to expel a person on these grounds, which included having a relevant Electorate Council attempt to resolve a dispute before having the issue heard by a Disciplinary and Disputes Committee.
On 9 November 2025 the Council voted to expel Member of Parliament Mariameno Kapa-Kingi. This followed a relationship breakdown between Kapa-Kingi and TPM leadership, and a purported suspension of her membership on 23 October 2025, which also included a resolution to “reset” the Te Tai Tokerau Electorate Executive by way of a Special General Meeting. The expulsion arose following allegations that Kapa-Kingi had misused her Parliamentary budget and that media interviews where she was critical of TPM had brought TPM into disrepute.
On 4 December Kapa-Kingi, alongside her Te Tai Tokerau Electorate Council ( “Applicants”) applied for a judicial review and interim injunction in the Wellington High Court challenging her expulsion from TPM. The Applicants alleged the expulsion violated the Constitution and that TPM’s President John Tamihere had not been properly elected. The following day the High Court granted the interim injunction, reinstating Kapa-Kingi’s membership to TPM pending a substantive hearing.
Were TPM’s decisions amenable to judicial review?
The Court first determined whether internal party decisions could be judicially reviewed and held to public law standards. TPM submitted that as a private organisation judicial review was not available for matters of internal Party discipline, but the Court found that a Member of Parliament’s membership in a political party and the valid appointment of a party president impacted public affairs and could not simply be a private matter. It noted that political parties are how the public engage in Parliamentary politics and so their internal processes have a public nature, related to government, that allows the court to conduct a review
First cause of action: purported suspension of Kapa-Kingi
The Applicant’s first challenge was to the purported decision of TPM’s Council to suspend Kapa-Kingi and “reset” the Te Tai Tokerau Electorate Executive. The Council comprised the TPM President, co-vice-presidents, co-leaders, Members of Parliament and members selected by each Māori electorate. Party MPs (excluding the co-leaders)and the council members from Te Tai Tokerau were not notified of the meeting to suspend Kapa-Kingi.
The Applicants argued that the Constitution did not provide any power to suspend a member and that TPM had failed to comply with the Constitution’s dispute resolution and complaints processes. TPM claimed that the power to suspend membership was inherent to the power to expel and/or cancel memberships.
The Court held there was no power to suspend a membership in the Constitution, implied or otherwise. It found that even if a power existed, TPM ignored relevant provisions of the Constitution such that the suspension could not stand. The Court cited the various procedural failings of the meeting, such as TPM’s MPs and the Te Tai Tokerau electorate not being invited or present, and that no notice of the specific resolution to suspend Kapa Kingi was given to attendees. The Court also noted the importance of tikanga, woven through the Constitution, which TPM did not follow when it suspended Kapa-Kingi.
Second cause of action: Kapa-Kingi’s purported expulsion from TPM
The Applicants challenged the legal and factual basis for Kapa-Kingi’s expulsion from TPM, claiming that the expulsion did not comply with the Constitution and that the factual basis for the expulsion was incorrect. They argued that TPM had not followed the correct procedure for expelling Kapa-Kingi from TPM and that she had not in fact misused Party funds, nor brought TPM into disrepute.
TPM argued that Kapa-Kingi had misspent Party funds by exceeding her Parliamentary Services budget, including through contracts with her son which they claimed was improper. They said her loyalty was also at the judgement of the Council, for which they relied on the media interviews Kapa-Kingi participated in where she was critical of Party leadership.
The Court found that TPM had not followed the Constitution’s requirement that it send a dispute to the relevant Electoral Council and instead had proceeded directly to action at the National Council level. A Discipline and Disputes Committee had also neither been formed nor used. As with the decision to suspend Kapa-Kingi, the decision to expel her was made at a meeting without Party MPs or Te Tai Tokerau electorate representatives. The Court found that the process used to expel Kapa-Kingi did not comply with the Constitution and the expulsion was therefore unlawful. The Court noted this was also contrary to the Constitution’s principles of tikanga, which included acknowledging the authority of individual electorate and the necessity of working towards unity.
The Applicants also argued that TPM had made a mistake of fact, submitting that the factual basis for Kapa-Kingi’s expulsion was incorrect. They claimed that there was no actual misuse of Party funds and that Kapa-Kingi had not brought the party into disrepute, such that the grounds for her to be expelled under the Constitution had not been made out.
Kapa-Kingi’s Parliamentary Services budget was independent of TPM, and Kapa-Kingi had otherwise been able to correct her forecasted overspend. The Applicants also noted that employing whanau was common in TPM and that Kapa-Kingi had not set out to bring TPM into disrepute through her media interviews. Nonetheless, the Court noted that a judicial review for a mistake of fact required TPM’s conclusions to be entirely untenable. It considered that whether Kapa-Kingi had in fact misused Party funds or brought the Party into disrepute were tenable value judgements open to TPM, provided it complied with the Constitution’s processes.
Third cause of action: John Tamihere’s presidency of TPM
The Applicants claimed John Tamihere had not been validly re-elected as President of TPM. The Constitution provided that elections for TPM’s President and two co-Vice Presidents would occur “on a rotational, triennial basis”. John Tamihere had first been elected as Party President in June 2022. At an Annual General Meeting in July 2024 TPM “affirmed” Tamihere’s position as President without opposition. The Applicants claimed that the affirmation of Tamihere’s position did not meet the Constitution’s requirements for nominating and voting on a Party President.
Aside from the minutes of the July 2024 meeting which recorded the affirmation of Tamihere as President, there was no evidence available on the procedure adopted for that meeting. The Court accepted that the minutes evidenced a sufficiently democratic process, particularly as the affirmation of Tamihere’s presidency was without opposition. The Court also noted that no other challenges had arisen to Tamihere’s presidency for the year and a half prior to the Applicants bringing this case. This cause of action did not succeed.
The High Court ordered that Mariameno Kapa-Kingi be reinstated as a member of TPM. This case highlights the importance of following internal processes correctly in a dispute, and also sets a precedent that political parties, despite being private organisations, do have a public nature that brings them within the jurisdiction of judicial review.
Update: following an application from the Speaker of the NewZealand House of Representatives (“Speaker”) seeking to adjust the wording ofthe High Court’s order, the High Court recalled and reissued this judgment. TheSpeaker was concerned that the High Court’s decision breached the principles ofcomity and Parliamentary privilege, by purporting to interpret Parliament’sStanding Orders in making an order that Kapa-Kingi be reinstated to the TPM ParliamentaryParty.
The High Court amended the orders given in its judgment. Itretained the declaration that the decisions to expel Kapa-Kingi from TPM wereunlawful and were set aside. Instead of ordering TPM to inform the Speaker thatKapa-Kingi was reinstated to TPM, the reissued judgment stated that the Court“would expect” that TPM “would consider whether it would be appropriate tonotify the Speaker that Ms Kapa-Kingi is now a member of the parliamentary pāti”.
For further information on this case or similar issues, please contact Director Brigitte Morten
An incarcerated plaintiff in a judicial review application had a significantly reduced costs order made against him in recognition of the chilling effect that costs orders have on potential plaintiffs bringing New Zealand Bill of Rights Act cases.
Lance Lee, an inmate at Rolleston Prison, applied for judicial review of the Department of Corrections (“Corrections”) decisions to decline medical prescriptions, and a prison policy of charging for hearing aid batteries. He alleged the decisions breached his rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“NZBORA”). This included his right not to be subject to torture or cruel treatment, right to freedom from discrimination, and right to be treated with humanity and respect while being deprived of liberty.
The application for judicial review failed decisively, and Corrections sought an award of costs from Mr Lee to reimburse them for their expenses incurred instructing a barrister to defend the application (which amounted to $11,648). Mr Lee requested that costs be either reduced or refused entirely.
Costs are awarded at the discretion of the Court in accordance with the High Court Rules. The standard position is that an unsuccessful party will pay costs to the successful party, though the Court may refuse to award costs or reduce them. Circumstances where the Court may exercise this discretion include when a proceeding concerned a matter of public interest, or where the party claiming costs had contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of a proceeding.
Mr Lee opposed costs on the grounds that the proceeding concerned a matter of public interest. For a reduction of costs on those grounds, it required the proceedings to genuinely engage the public interest, have merit, and be of importance beyond the interests of the unsuccessful party. Just because a case invokes human rights does not necessarily mean it concerns a matter of public interest.
Mr Lee submitted that a costs order would be contrary to his right to justice as affirmed by section 27 of NZBORA and would discourage other inmates from initiating legal proceedings to uphold their own rights. He argued that the Court had agreed his claim had merit as they had refused to strike it out and relied on Gorgus v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, where a prisoner successfully appealed a costs order for an unsuccessful NZBORA claim.
Corrections submitted that they acted appropriately throughout the proceedings, including signalling the prospects of costs to Mr Lee. They submitted Mr Lee’s claims were for his personal benefit, were without merit, and had already incurred public costs from Corrections staff having to take time to provide affidavit evidence.
The court considered that the judicial review had little public benefit. The medical decisions were non-justiciable and personal to his circumstances, so did not have the potential to benefit other inmates. The prison policy to charge for hearing aid batteries considered the personal circumstances of prisoners, which the Court said limited the benefit Mr Lee’s review would have for other prisoners.
Citing Gorgus, the Court nonetheless noted the chilling effect that the risk of costs orders has on potential plaintiffs. The Court recognised the policy interest in not discouraging litigants with tenable grounds of review from accessing the courts to vindicate their rights. This interest is balanced against not wanting to immunise litigants with meritless claims from adverse costs awards.
The Court noted that Mr Lee’s status as a prisoner and lack of access to substantial funds were not a barrier to an award of costs, but they did make Mr Lee the kind of person whose access to justice needed to be preserved and recognised. The Court considered it appropriate to substantially reduce the costs Mr Lee would pay to Corrections.
The Court ordered Mr Lee to pay $1000 to Corrections for costs incurred defending his application for judicial review. This was a significant reduction from a standard costs order.
For further information on this case or similar issues, please contact Managing Director Brigitte Morten
